In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER HUGO MEYNELL University of Calgary Calgary, Alberta IN THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of rthe ba1Sic ~deas of Heidegger from SIOmething of a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, 1 as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained from Heidegger's work but that it contains (...) a fow very perilous oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties and our trivi1al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from 1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art :and poetry, together with a,sustained thinking-through of the nmbure of consciousness :and of the woJ.'11d 1 wihich it reveals, have the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a consiiew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa- :vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never e1q>erienced any more-least of all those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.5 These were not sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this phenomerno~ogy did not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims :and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.6 Husserl, as he himself aJC1knowledged, was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the decisiY.e matter for,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?" 8 Access to the things themselves is best thought of in true Greek fashion as " aletheia, the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself." 9 (A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out of ·an etymological point; " aletheia," the Greek word for """.t-1.,, • • 1 " i-th. " cealm t),..,ruuu, iI.S eqwv:a1ent to a- e ei,a, non~con · en. So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the 00['rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondence with states of a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object express1 ed by them; it is the self-showing which is necessary for things if 5 Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 21. 6 Ibid., 13. 7 Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33. sHeidegger, On Tflrne and Bemg (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79; Krell, 14. oHeidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13. 616 HUGO MEYNELL they 1arie to become objects of assertions.at all.10 The £.act is that.rulil (lO!l'respondence, " rudequation "11 or whatev. (shrink)

In his autobiography, Mr Leonard Woolf very forcibly protests Lord Keynes's familiar account of the kind of influence G. E. Moore had exerted over those who were later to become members of the Bloomsbury Group. You will remember that Keynes, writing in 1938 about his early beliefs as an undergraduate at Cambridge, maintained of himself and his companions: ‘We accepted Moore's religion … and discarded his morals … meaning by “religion” one's attitude towards oneself and the ultimate and by “morals” (...) one's attitude towards the outside world and the intermediate. (shrink)

TO BE A THEIST, THE AUTHOR ARGUES, IS TO CONSTRUE THE WORLD AS A WHOLE ON THE MODEL OF A RATIONAL AGENT’S ACTIVITIES. CHRISTIAN THEISM IS CHARACTERISED BY PARTICULAR CLAIMS AS TO MATTERS OF FACT: GOD IS (A) THAT WHICH IS SAID TO MAKE ALL THINGS, (B) THE OBJECT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, (C) THAT WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY BRING ABOUT A STATE OF JUSTICE, (D) THAT WHICH BROUGHT IT ABOUT THAT JESUS LIVED, DIED AND ROSE FROM THE DEAD. MEYNELL CONTENDS (...) THAT THIS IS A LOGICALLY COHERENT IDEA AND SHOWS WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEPENDENT CONCEPTS OF GRACE, EVIL, PRAYER, PROVIDENCE, MIRACLE AND THE AFTER-LIFE THAT THE CHRISTIAN FAITH HAS ESCHATOLOGICAL TRUTH-CONDITIONS. (BP). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:498 BOOK REVIEWS generations of theologians across denominational lines. Both Placher and Hunsinger at the end of their essays choose quotations from within Frei's own writings to give a synoptic portrait of the man and his work. Placher chooses a remark about Niebuhr's sense of vocation as a theologian (20), and Hunsinger one about knowledge of that seemingly elusive reality, a person's identity (257). However one might come away (...) from this challenging collection of essays, further confused or more enlightened, more in agreement or disagreement, I think every reader will recognize the coincidence of intellectual perspicuity and generosity with passionate faith. Regis College, Toronto School of Theology Toronto, Ontario, Canada GEORGE P. SCHNER, S.J. Reasoned Faith. Edited by ELEONORE STUMP. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993. Pp. x + 364. As the editor remarks in her "Introduction," it is not so long ago that the analytical philosophy of religion consisted very largely of discussions of the meaningfulness of religious language, and of arguments about the existence of God. Nowadays it is more adventurous, ranging over such topics as creation, providence, and God's responsibility for sin. According to Robert Merrihew Adams, the statement "truth is subjectivity," though one of the most famous, is also one of the most misunderstood in Kierkegaard's writings. He argues that, taken in context within the Concluding Unscientifu: Postscript, the statement is by no means incompatible with the objective truth of religious belief. From the point of view of the Postscript, a member of an idolatrous community who prays to her God with "the entire passion of the infinite" has more of the truth than one who prays in a false spirit from within Christendom; but this implies that the latter does have some truth. Whatever the deficiencies in her faith, she is clearly admitted to be in possession of the true concept of God objectively speaking (223 ). Adams maintains, quite rightly in the reviewer's opinion, that the Postscript is excessively pessimistic about the integration of the ideals of subjectivity and objectivity, of passionate commitment on the one side and rational assessment of evidence on the other, in religious faith (21). A useful distinction is made by Scott MacDonald between "occurrent" and "dispositional" belief; this seems to resolve some of the more puzzling paradoxes about the relation of the more cognitive and propositional side of faith to other aspects which may be thought essential to it. The demons alluded to by St. James (2:19) might believe dispositionally that their highest fulfillment BOOK REVIEWS 499 was to be found in obeying the divine will, and so performing acts of charity and service to other creatures. But to avoid the inconvenience of acting in such a way, they could think of God occurrently as just a powerful being who makes burdensome demands (55). For MacDonald, the cognitive component of faith has only two elements, belief that certain propositions are true, and belief that the kind of response of the will which is also essential to faith may be grounded on these (56). "We can make sense of Christian faith if we think of it simply as belief that Christianity is true plus an appropriate volitional response to that truth" (69). Against mainline Christian accounts like those of Augustine and Aquinas, he sees no good reason to suppose that one cannot have faith in propositions for which one has conclusive proof, but only in those for which one's justification is relatively weak. He provides interesting grounds for contradiction of a view which has been expounded by both Robert Adams and John Hick, that only such uncertainty can ground the trust which is essential to the relationship which human beings ought to have to God (59). "My ability to love and trust my wife, to commit myself without reservation to her well-being and to the goals and purposes we have chosen as definitive of our common life seem in no way dependent on my being uncertain about what she is like or what she will do" (60). On the question of how faith ought to be related to the demands of reason, Robert Audi remarks that, up to the middle 1970s... (shrink)

Problém demarkace mezi vědou a metafyzikou byl v první polovině 20. století považován za centrální problém normativní filozofie vědy. W. W. Bartley ve svém textu z roku 1962 přesvědčivě ukázal, že dichotomie mezi vědou a metafyzikou (ne-vědou) není důležitá, jelikož neposkytuje žádné relevantní údaje o daném tvrzení (teorii). Otázku posunul do roviny hodnocení a akceptability teorií a představil vlastní kritérium "demarkace" mezi dobrou a špatnou teorií podle množství problémů, které řeší. V této studii bude představena Bartleyho argumentace v kontextech (...) popperiánských diskuzí, Bartleyho kritika induktivismu a Popperovy falzifikace. Cílem tohoto textu je zejména kritická reakce na znovuotevření problému demarkace mezi vědou a pseudovědou v současné diskuzi a poukázání na již minimálně trojí (Bartley, Kuhn, Laudan) odmítnutí problému demarkace v minulosti. V závěru studie je nabídnuto řešení v souladu s Bartleyho koncepcí akceptability teorií. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO METAPHYSICS WHAT I HOPE to do in what follows is to sketch how one might go about constructing a rational, ritical, and in a sense 'scientific' metaphysics. It goes without saying that a great many current conceptions of ' metaphysics ' are abusive. On one account, ' metaphysics ' is whatever isn't science or common sense, where science and common sense are assumed to be good (...) things. On another, 'metaphysics' consists of an abuse of language which is brought about by a wrenching of it out of its normal context. Again, ' metaphysics ' is supposed to substitute a bloodless dance of categories for the spontaneous outflow of religious feeling, or idolatrous human constructions for the Word of God. However, it seems in general much clearer that metaphysics is to be contemptuously repudiated than exactly what it is. A traditional definition of metaphysics is ' the study of being qua being'. It is perhaps understandable that many should complain, when confronted by such a sententious formula, that such an inquiry is a waste of time, and one had much better get on with the more fruitful business of pursuing one of the particular sciences. (Ezra Pound once remarked that, since the Renaissance, a philosopher had been someone who was too damned lazy to work in a laboratory; and the same may be felt to apply a fortiori to the metaphysician.) And yet there are problems which do not seem to go away, however often it is confidently asserted that they have done so or are about to do so, problems which might be said to be concerned with ' being ' or ' reality ' at a very high level of generality. Those who brush the problems aside may perhaps sometimes be suspected of arbitrarily taking sides on them. For example, the psychological doctrine known as behaviorism is ~05 206 HUGO MEYNELL based on the assumption that all talk about thoughts, feelings, and emotions is in the final analysis reducible to talk about the behavior of organisms. But it is one thing to allow such an assumption to dominate one's work, another to set it clearly, another still to examine and to justify it. If any examination of the account of the relation of mind to matter implied by behaviorism has to be of such generality as to enter the realm of the 'metaphysical ', it would seem to be still worth carrying out, unless indeed we are to accept behaviorism quite uncritically as a dogma. Just the same applies to writing which assumes the existence of non-existence of a Deity. The fact is that every passage of speech or writing which exists, and makes claims as to matters of fact, involves certain assumptions about the ultimate constituents of things, and about the nature and interrelations of appearance, reality, mind, matter, experience, causality, things, properties, events, space, time, God, and so on. Let us call each such set of basic assumptions (including the ones mentioned earlier, that talk about minds is reducible to talk about the behavior of organisms, that there is or is not a God) a 'metaphysic'. Let us say that 'metaphysics ' is an attempt to discuss, and to come to well-founded conclusions on, the question as to whether any such ' metaphysic ' is to be preferred, as more closely approximating to the truth about how things are in the world, to any other. Empiricism, idealism, materialism, critical realism, and naive realism, will at this rate each be a 'metaphysic'; that is to say, each consists of theses about the existence, nature and interrelations of actual or alleged basic constituents of reality like those listed above. Any attempt to discuss the rival merits of any of them, or.to defend any one as more appropriate than the others, will count as ' metaphysics '. The arguments by which Plato, Leibniz, or Hegel established their conclusions about the ultimate nature of things evidently count as ' metaphysics ' according to our conception; and this does seem in conformity with ordinary usage. Perhaps it is obvious that one such 'metaphysic' (say, materialism) is to be preferred to the rest; FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO METAPHYSICS 207 or at least that another such (say, idealism) should be repudiated ; but it would be as... (shrink)